Despite predictive success, population dynamics and evolutionary game theory [1, 2] still pose fundamental problems. Violation of the competitive exclusion principle in plankton communities provides an example. A promising solution of this "paradox of the plankton" [3] comes from theories involving cyclic competition [4] [5] [6] , an evolutionary analogue of the classical rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game. However, modeling probabilistic RPS structures one encounters a fundamental difficulty [7, 8] : the pairs rock-scissors, scissorspaper, and paper-rock possess representations in separate Kolmogorovian probability spaces, but a single global probability space for entire triplets does not exist. Populations that take part in cyclic competition should therefore involve probabilistic incompatibilities, analogous to those occurring in quantum mechanics. Here, using experimental data collected from 1990 to 2011 on the RPS cycles of lizards, we show that the incompatibilities are indeed unavoidable, and the data cannot be reconstructed from a single Kolmogorovian probability space. We then prove that the effect is genuinely quantum probabilistic, i.e. all the probabilities can be formulated in terms of a single density matrix and a set of non-commuting projectors. This formal quantum structure is dormant in games where probabilities of strategies do not entangle with probabilities of payoffs, and thus could be overlooked. In more realistic scenarios, involving games "with ace in a sleeve", the non-Kolmogorovian structure can be activated. Surprisingly, lizards occasionally do play such games. In consequence, the formalism of evolutionary games, similarly to quantum mechanics, should begin with density matrix equations. Implications of our finding extend beyond lizard communities, given that RPS games are common in nature [9] and higher dimensional RPS games may be even more common in ecosystems [6] .
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How to understand the result? First, it would be absurd to conclude that there exist some microscopic processes of a quantum mechanical type that are responsible for lizard population dynamics. The actual reason is much more fundamental. It lies in the fact that both evolutionary games and quantum phenomena share the prop- erty of being context dependent. It has been known in the quantum mechanics community for at least 30 years that contextuality is one of the fundamental sources of the quantumness of quantum probability [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . One can even say that the role contextuality plays in probability is similar to that of curvature in the geometry of non-Euclidean spaces, and is equally ubiquitous [15] . Kolmogorovity in probability is like Euclideanity in geometry. But as non-Euclideanity is not an indication of gravity, non-Kolmogorovity is not an indication of quanta, even though geometry becomes non-Euclidean in the presence of gravity, and quantum statistics is nonKolmogorovian. Now, how is it possible that the quantum aspect of a classical game has been overlooked so far, and why is it important? The catch is that standard game theory concentrates on probabilities of strategies, but probabilities of "packs of cards", inherent in payoff matrices, are treated as given and not entangling with behaviors of the players. But these are the latter probabilities that may reveal non-Kolmogorovian properties in classical games. In the RPS game, each matrix element of a payoff matrix is evaluated in a different probability space. As long as there are no processes that entangle these two levels of probability, one can ignore implicit non-Kolmogorovity of payoffs. However, if the two levels do get entangled the non-Kolmogorovity will become essential.
In classical evolutionary game theory, the elements of the payoff matrix are assumed to be time invariant and evolution of the system takes place as frequency dependent fitness changes thereby changing the relative success and the probability of encountering each strategy over time. In evolutionary biology, the strategies can be identified with morphs, and many species exhibit color polymorphisms associated with alternative male reproductive strategies [9, 16, 17] . The prevalence of multiple morphs is a challenge to evolutionary theory because a single strategy should prevail unless morphs have exactly the same fitness or a fitness advantage when rare. One of us has shown in several papers that the three color morphs of side-blotched lizards, Uta stansburiana, follow an RPS-like dynamics [9, 16, [18] [19] [20] . More precisely, males have either orange (O), blue (B) or yellow (Y ) throats and each type follows a fixed mating strategy, as follows:
(i) Orange-throated males are strongest and do not form strong pair bonds; instead, they fight blue-throated males for access to their females. Yellow-throated males, however, manage to copulate with females in the orange male harems. The large size and aggression is caused by high testosterone production [21] .
(ii) Blue-throated males are smaller in size and form strong pair bonds. While they are outcompeted by orange-throated males, they can defend against yellowthroated ones via cooperation with other blue-throated neighbors. Because blue-throated males produce less testosterone they are not as strong as the orange-throated males, but it gives them the advantage of being less aggressive and able to form strong pair bonds, and also engage in territorial cooperation with neighboring bluethroated males [19] .
(iii) Yellow-throated males are smallest, and their coloration mimics females. This lets them approach females in the harems of orange-throated males and mate when the males are distracted. This is less likely to work with a female that has bonded with a blue-throated male, and by virtue of his vigilant cooperative blue-throated male partner.
Points (i)-(iii) can be summarized as "O beats B, B beats Y , and Y beats O", which is similar to the RPS rules, hence O provides a context for B which, in turn, provides a context for Y , which provides a context for O. Thus, the biology of the RPS lizards hints at a deeper underlying contextuality to the interactions beyond the simple pairwise dynamics that can be encapsulated in pairwise elements of the RPS payoff matrix.
In order to perform the test for Kolmogorovity we have to rephrase the lizard game as a two-system correlation experiment. So, let us now consider the three throatcolor morphs of side-blotched lizard, where rare O, B, Y define R, P , S of Alice (common O, Y , B define R, P , S of Bob). The rules of the game are: If Alice chooses R and Bob chooses P then (R, P ) = (−, +). Analogously: (R, S) = (+, −), (P, S) = (−, +), (P, R) = (+, −), (S, R) = (−, +), (S, P ) = (+, −).
We employ the frequencies from 1990-2011 collected using the same methods and from the same population as in the original study on lizards [16] . Looking at Figure 2, we find that there are no games where Alice and Bob play the same strategy (two morphs cannot be simultaneously rare or simultaneously common). The con- 
Note that the conditioning is not by the result obtained by Bob, but by the strategy he plays, i.e. by the context in which Alice is supposed to win. The diagonal elements correspond to cases where the players play the same strategy, which does not occur in our AliceBob reformulation, so we skip them. Now, let us assume that the above probabilities can be modeled on a single probability space. So, there exists a measurable space Λ and a probability measure µ on Λ. The events, say, O A = + and O A = − must correspond to sets O A ⊂ Λ and O A = Λ \ O A , respectively. Similar rules hold for the remaining random variables. Then, by our assumption, the joint probability that rare O fails whereas common Y succeeds in siring young is
The probability that the two morphs both succeed is
The physical structure of POVM. Since Tr (ρU P Alice P Bob P Alice U † ) = Tr (ρP Alice U P Bob U †P Alice ), whereP Alice = U P Alice U † , an identical effect is obtained by replacing the first filter P Alice byP Alice , and including the dynamics between the filters. Note that U refers to an internal dynamics of the measuring device and not to the dynamics of probabilities themselves. The latter would evolve by means of ρ(t).
However 
link probabilities at different levels of contextuality. The right side refers to results of measurements of random variables, but the left one just to the context. Actually, (1) is a formal way of defining context by means of types of measurements performed by the other player.
As we can see, the contradiction is very elementary, p(Y B = +|B A ) = p(Y B = +|O A ), and certainly typical of all nontrivial evolutionary games. It remains to prove the less obvious property, namely that the model is not only non-Kolmogorovian, but also quantum. To do so, it is enough to find a density operator ρ and, for any pair of morphs i A and j B , the set of four positive operator valued measures (POVM) [22] E i A ∩j B satisfying p i A ∩j B = Tr (ρE i A ∩j B ) and
The form of POVM that is sufficiently general for our purposes physically corresponds to experimental devices consisting of two filters [23] , supplemented by unitary dynamics before or after the first filter, see Figure 3 . The dynamics and the first filter define the context for the second filter. Denote,
, be any vectors that together with |1 form an orthonormal basis. The density operator ρ = |1 1|, and the commuting projectors P Alice = I − P Alice , P Bob = I − P Bob , imply the resolution of identity P Alice P Bob + P Alice P Bob + P Alice P Bob + P Alice P Bob = I, and the correct probabilities,
Now let a , b , c , d be any other four probabilities, and
We again complete |1 to an orthonormal basis by means of |2 , |3 , |4 . Then
U so derived automatically guarantees that
Each of these POVMs is a projector. In this way one can encode an arbitrary number of quadruples of probabilities in a single ρ, similarly to what one does in quantum cryptography with infinitely many qubits encoded in a single two-dimensional state. The essence of contextuality lies in noncommutativity of the triple (U, P Alice , P Bob ). This is why in a classical framework, where everything commutes, the trick with U will not work. Here, it works for all quadruples of probabilities. The quantum model of probability thus turns out to be general enough to include all RPS-type population games. The fact that nonlinear soliton density matrix equations [24] [25] [26] , due to their universality typical of soliton systems, can have biological applications was anticipated in [27] , although the authors were not aware that standard replicator equations of game theory can be cast into a quantum-probability von Neumann form [28, 29] where ρ is precisely of the type we have just employed in reconstruction of the lizard probabilities. Still, for replicator equations the corresponding U = I, so all the probabilities of strategies may be regarded as belonging to a single context. A single probability space is enough for replicator dynamics, a fact explaining its Kolmogorovity. Generalization beyond a single probability space, performed at the level of strategies, would lead to nonstandard population games. The so-called quantumlike games [14, 15] , if extended to population dynamics, would belong to this category.
What we do in the present paper is more fundamental. The game we consider is completely classical. The quantum-probabilistic structure is there present but dormant. Can it be activated? In principle it can, in cases where the dynamics couples "pack-of-cards" probabilities, implicit in payoff matrices, with the probabilities of players' strategies. This is what happens in games with "ace in a sleeve", whose replicator-type equation can be derived directly from the Gafiychuk-Prykarpatsky von Neumann form [28, 29] generalized to non-product density matrices in the same way it is done in nonlinear generalizations of quantum mechanics [30] . Surprisingly, games of this type are played by the lizards. In the absence of orange, and in the presence of blue, yellow can pull an ace out its sleeve and transforms to blue [18, 21] . Further research will require contextualities of higher order. For example, blue is only highly successful against yellow if found in the context of low orange neighborhoods and other blue males [19] . Plankton communities will be even more complicated. These behaviors themselves do not violate classical evolutionary game theory, rather it is impossible to model the probability space with existing game theoretical models and quantum probability models involving a single density matrix are required. In order to understand the logic of our proof it is instructive to consider the ideal game, characterized by the following simple table of conditional probabilities,
Concrete values on the diagonal are irrelevant. Joint probabilities are thus given by
The remaining probabilities vanish. Assuming a classical probability space we can write
However, p(S A = + ∩ P B = +) = µ(S A ∩ P B ) = 0, p(S A = − ∩ P B = +) = µ(S A ∩ P B ) = 0, µ(S A ∩ P B ) + µ(S A ∩ P B ) = µ(P B ) = 0, which implies 0 = 1. The same type of contradiction occurs in the lizard game.
Ace-in-a-sleeve replicator equation
The standard Kolmogorovian replicator equation,
involves two types of probabilities. The ones we are interested in are denoted by p lm;j . The indices l, m in p lm;j index probability spaces in a probability manifold. p lm;j are the "pack-of-cards" probabilities implicitly present in any game, and parametrizing the game, but treated as fixed and independent of the probabilities of strategies x k . The equivalent form of (4), found in [28] , reads a nl x l .
Here P 1,k = diag(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . 0), with 1 on kth position. Now denote p 11,j = p j , 1 | = ( √ p 1 , . . . , √ p N ), and ρ 2 = |1 1 |. We know that there exist E lm;j such that p lm;j = Tr ρ 2 E lm;j . E lm;j = U lm P 2,j U † lm for some projectors P 2,j , p j = Tr ρ 2 P 2,j . Define ρ = ρ 1 ⊗ ρ 2 ,â lm = j b j I 1 ⊗ E lm;j . Now, x k = Tr ρ(P 1,k ⊗ I 2 ), p lm;j = Tr ρ(I 1 ⊗ E lm;j ), a lm = Tr ρâ lm . Denoting 
under the constraints ρ = ρ 1 ⊗ρ 2 , dρ 2 /dt = 0. The constraints imply [D(ρ), ρ] = [D 1 (ρ 1 ), ρ 1 ]⊗ρ 2 , dρ/dt = dρ 1 /dt⊗ρ 2 . Relaxing the constraints in (5) one generalizes (4) to games with ace in a sleeve, where correlations between x k and p lm;j are no longer ignored.
